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The Role of the Courts in Time of War 
William C. Banks 
Abstract 
The role of the courts in judging the actions of government in 
wartime has ranged from extreme deference to careful probing of 
alleged government excesses over more than two centuries. The 
courts’ record has reflected the nature of the armed conflicts the 
United States has engaged in and the legal bases for the actions at 
issue. In the aggregate, the courts have served as a necessary 
counterweight to government overreaching in times of national 
security crisis. It is easy to underestimate the institutional problems 
confronting judges who are asked to make momentous decisions in 
times of national crisis—difficulties of fact-finding and assessing 
the risks of being wrong, among others. Yet no other part of 
government is as equipped as the judiciary to anchor the nation to 
its core values during a storm. 
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I. Introduction 
If there was a “war on the rule of law”1 after 9/11, it was waged 
primarily by the Executive Branch, not the courts. To be sure, the 
courts often deferred to Executive Branch decisions during the 
unhelpfully labeled “war on terror.” Deference is generally 
appropriate when courts review actions of the elected branches. At 
other times, however, the courts overturned or limited Bush 
Administration national security decisions. The mixed judicial 
record continues during the Obama Administration and the 
ongoing armed conflict against al Qaeda and its affiliates.2  
To the extent that a pattern of judicial deference may be traced 
through the war on terror disputes, the Bush-era decisions reflect 
tendencies that began with Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s, 
when the courts began to employ a special deference to actions 
taken by the military, ordered by a civilian commander in chief. 
Yet a series of war on terror-era Supreme Court decisions on 
military detention practices between 2004 and 2008 repudiated, or 
at least limited, the worst excesses of Executive unilateralism 
during the Bush presidency. It is too soon to tell whether those 
                                                                                                     
1. Wayne McCormack, U.S. Judicial Independence: Victim in the “War on 
Terror”, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 305 (2014) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). This Article is written as an invited response to Professor 
McCormack’s article. 
2. See McCormack, supra note 1, at 312, 344–46 (describing the mixed set 
of decisions that courts have issued under the Obama administration).  
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decisions also signaled a renewed commitment for the courts to 
review carefully the merits of decisions involving the military. 
There are at least two other dimensions to the story of the 
judicial role in wartime. Sometimes federal courts have been 
anything but deferent. First, judges may become activist 
lawmakers, providing remedies to victims of unlawful government 
conduct in countering terrorism, for example, or making new law 
in ruling for government contractors to immunize them from 
plaintiffs’ claims.3 
Second, federal judges also preside over criminal prosecutions 
of alleged terrorists. Even while the Bush Administration was 
unilaterally shaping the contours of its war on terror, the White 
House, Justice Department, and federal courts were implementing 
an important policy to use intelligence and law enforcement tools 
as part of a multi-faceted set of approaches to countering 
terrorism. Nearly 500 criminal prosecutions involving 
international terrorism have been concluded since 9/11,4 and 
Supermax federal prisons house more than 350 convicted 
international terrorists.5 The judges made evidentiary and other 
rulings in these cases, but juries decided guilt or innocence. The 
deference label simply does not fit the criminal cases. 
Meanwhile, Congress has forbidden the closure of the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and prohibited the Obama 
Administration from bringing Gitmo detainees to stand trial in the 
United States.6 Yet the Administration has successfully 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Al-Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Va. 
2013), vacated and remanded sub nom. Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); Benjamin Wittes et. al, The Emerging Law of 
Detention 2.0: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, Brookings (May 
12, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/05/guantanamo-
wittes (last updated Mar. 29, 2013) (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILLUSION OF JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 2 (2014) (“Since the September 11 attacks, more 
than 500 individuals have been prosecuted in US federal courts for terrorism or 
related offenses—40 cases per year on average.”). 
 5. Fred Kaplan, There Are Already 355 Terrorists in American Prisons, 
SLATE (MAY 29 2009, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2009/05/there_are_
already_355_terrorists_in_american_prisons.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See Ken Gude, What Has to Happen to Close Guantanamo Bay This Year, 
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transferred alleged terrorists apprehended overseas to civilian 
detention facilities in the United States and has prosecuted them 
in the federal courts,7 over the loud and vitriolic complaints by 
critics in Congress and elsewhere that these suspects belong at 
Gitmo and should be tried by military commission.8 In these 
instances the Administration relies on the federal courts as part of 
a whole-of-government effort to counter terrorism. 
Throughout our history, the courts have been central 
participants in shaping the limits of governmental authority and 
the resultant scope of civil liberties during wartime. The war on 
terror—more accurately described as a war against al Qaeda, its 
affiliates, and the Taliban—was not our gravest crisis. Our nation 
was born through violent revolution, and the Civil War was the 
contemporary equivalent of an all-out nuclear attack on the nation. 
In their time, the two World Wars were potentially more 
calamitous than the 9/11 era. In each of these wars, the Judicial 
Branch was an active participant, sometimes generously deferent 
to the government’s expansive interpretation of its wartime 
constitutional prerogatives, other times especially attentive to 
what have been viewed as unchanging constitutional values. 
The war on terror likewise required judges to make critical 
judgments about the Constitution and other laws, and about the 
institutional role of the judiciary in a time of war. The record of the 
                                                                                                     
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 31, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2014/01/31/83328/what-
has-to-happen-to-close-guantanamo-bay-this-year/ (arguing the Obama 
Administration should push Congress to lift the transfer ban on Gitmo detainees) 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 7. E.g., Richard A. Serrano, Detainee in Afghanistan to Face Charges in 
U.S. Court, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:17 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-detainee-
us-court-20141023-story.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Danny Gonzalez, Terrorists Shouldn’t Be Tried in the Same Courts 
as U.S. Citizens, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2013, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-al-qaeda-spokesperson-sulaiman-
abu-ghaith-be-prosecuted-in-federal-court/terrorists-shouldnt-be-tried-in-the-
same-courts-as-us-citizens (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (asserting that “[t]he 
process of military tribunals currently in place at Guantanamo Bay is perfectly 
legal and satisfies the right of due process for terrorist suspects”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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courts has been mixed, but not dramatically different from other 
periods of armed conflict. 
II. The Case Against the Bush Administration 
The Bush Administration claimed a practically limitless 
constitutional authority to act unilaterally during a war that 
lasted longer than World War II. As viewed by the Administration, 
terrorism and associated threats in the post-Cold War world 
simply outstripped past security threats against the United States. 
Their thinking was that these changed circumstances required a 
more flexible kind of executive power, one that cannot be readily 
accommodated with multi-branch deliberation.9 In the face of these 
threats, the qualities that Alexander Hamilton identified as 
characteristic of the Executive alone—the capacity to act with 
“decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch”10—are overwhelming and 
essential advantages. When the nature of warfare against these 
unconventional enemies relies less on set-piece battles between 
nation-states and more on tools like intelligence gathering and 
covert action and quick strikes against terrorists in sanctuaries 
across sovereign boundaries from traditional battlefields, waiting 
for deliberation or even review or ratification by Congress or the 
courts would compromise America’s ability to defend itself. As a 
result, the institutional roles and individual rights that those 
traditional constitutional structures are designed to protect may 
be shortchanged along the way. 
In the first few years after 9/11, the argument was used to 
justify unprecedented executive unilateralism in high profile 
disputes that found their way to our courts. The national security 
trump card allegedly overcame laws barring torture and cruel or 
degrading treatment;11 supported the “outsourcing” of torture to 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 116, 122–23 (2014) (comparing the coordinated, multi-branch action 
against co-belligerents during World War II with the Bush Administration’s 
unilateral practices under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF)). 
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 11. See Ray Sanchez, Obama: U.S. ‘Crossed a Line’ and Tortured After 9/11 
Attacks, CNN (last updated Aug. 3, 2014, 3:14 PM) 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/01/politics/obama-torture-comments/ (last visited 
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other countries, such as Syria and Egypt;12 permitted detaining 
individuals, including Americans, indefinitely without any due 
process;13 and allowed spying on Americans’ phone calls and 
e-mails in violation of federal statutes and the Fourth 
Amendment.14 The federal courts were complicit in some, though 
hardly all, of these excesses, but the driving force was the 
Executive. 
III. Historic Highlights 
When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 
mid-nineteenth century, he was struck by the central role that the 
courts play in our system of government: “Scarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or 
later, into a judicial question.”15 It is true that our federal courts 
have sometimes turned Tocqueville’s observation on its head by 
refusing to decide legal questions on various grounds. Nonetheless, 
the federal judiciary and its record over more than two centuries 
are celebrated worldwide for making principled decisions based on 
the rule of law and for the judges’ independence from the elected 
branches of our government.  
Early in our nation’s history, the role of the federal courts in 
the constitutional framework for national security operated more 
or less as the Framers envisioned. In a trilogy of decisions 
                                                                                                     
Nov. 26, 2014) (noting that certain “enhanced interrogation techniques” likely 
constituted torture) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s 
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. 
 13. See Erik Kain, President Obama Signed the National Defense 
Authorization Act—Now What?, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2012, 11:56 AM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/02/president-obama-signed-the-
national-defense-authorization-act-now-what/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) 
(suggesting the National Defense Authorization Act may allow indefinite 
detention and claiming the federal government has been “overreacting” in 
response to terrorism after 9/11, “allow[ing] our fear to undermine our freedom 
we concede to the very terrorists we hope to defeat”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 14. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs did not succeed on their statutory or 
Fourth Amendment claims regarding the Government’s bulk telephony metadata 
program). 
 15. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945). 
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upholding the legality of the undeclared war with France, the 
Supreme Court actively participated in affirming the principle that 
the executive discretion to conduct an undeclared or limited war 
was prescribed by those actions authorized by Congress.16 In one 
of the cases, Little v. Barreme,17 the Court, speaking through Chief 
Justice Marshall, held that a Navy officer who had executed a 
presidential order during the war with France was liable to the 
owners of the vessel he had seized leaving from a French port.18 
One of the statutes enacted to authorize the war permitted the 
seizure of ships “bound or sailing to” any French port, while the 
President’s order said “to or from.”19 Because “the legislature 
seem[s] to have prescribed . . . the manner in which this law shall 
be carried into execution,”20 what might otherwise have been a 
reasonable order by the Commander in Chief could not make 
lawful the officer’s act. The Court did not abstain, nor did it defer 
to the presidential order.21 
Similarly, in United States v. Smith,22 Supreme Court Justice 
William Patterson (a Framer of the Constitution from New Jersey), 
sitting on circuit, upheld prosecution of Smith and others under 
the Neutrality Act,23 a 1794 statute that makes criminal the 
mounting of any military operation against a nation with which 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. 170, 177 (1804) (upholding the legality of 
statutes of the United States prohibiting intercourse with France and its 
dependencies); Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. 1, 29 (1801) (examining legislation of 
Congress, such as “An Act More Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts 
of the United States,” in order to determine the “real situation of America in 
regard to France”); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800) (“The United States and the 
French republic are in a qualified state of hostility. An imperfect war, or a war, 
as to certain objects, and to a certain extent, exists between the two nations; and 
this modified warfare is authori[z]ed by the constitutional authority of our 
country.”). 
 17. 6 U.S. 170 (1804). 
 18. See id. at 179 (declaring that instructions from the Executive “cannot 
change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those 
instructions would have been a plain trespass”). 
 19. An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the 
United States and France, ch. 10, § 8, 2 Stat. 7 (1800); Little, 6 U.S. at 178. 
 20. Little, 6 U.S. at 177–78. 
 21. Id. at 178–79. 
 22. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806). 
 23. An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381 (1794). 
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the United States is at peace.24 Smith sought immunity from 
prosecution on the grounds that the President had authorized his 
military plan against Spanish rulers in what is now Venezuela.25 
Justice Patterson ruled that “the president . . . cannot control the 
statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he 
authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”26  
The judicial branch also played a central role in some of the 
most important actions of the government during the Civil War. 
President Lincoln first responded to the attack on Fort Sumter by 
blockading the southern ports without going to Congress for a 
declaration of war. In The Prize Cases,27 the Supreme Court 
sustained the President’s actions, by a 5-4 margin, and held that 
the Commander in Chief had a constitutional duty to repel the 
attack on the United States without awaiting special legislative 
authority, and that Congress’s ratification of the President’s 
blockade after the fact compensated for the lack of prior 
authorization.28 Note that the Court did not decline to decide the 
case because of the political question doctrine or the immunity of 
executive officials for their official actions. 
When early in the war President Lincoln unilaterally 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus and imposed military rule in 
Maryland, Chief Justice Taney ruled that the President lacked 
unilateral authority to suspend the writ.29 Although Lincoln 
ignored Taney’s decision, at the end of the war the full Supreme 
Court ruled against the President’s effort to try civilian southern 
sympathizer Lambdin Milligan before a military commission in 
Indiana, at least in part because the civil courts were open and 
operating.30  
                                                                                                     
 24. See Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230 (affirming that the power to make war is 
“exclusively vested in [C]ongress”). 
 25. Id. at 1228–30. 
 26. Id. at 1230–31. 
 27. 67 U.S. 635 (1862). 
 28. See id. at 668 (differentiating between the initiation of a war, for which 
the Executive cannot call, and situations in which “war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation,” when “the President is not only authorized but bound to resist 
force by force”). 
 29. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861). 
 30. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866). 
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Fast forward to World War II. A few weeks after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, in February 1942, President Roosevelt promulgated 
an executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe 
“military areas” from which persons might be excluded.31 Several 
such areas were created near the West Coast in the coming weeks, 
and Congress then made it a crime to remain in any military area 
contrary to applicable regulations. The military commander for the 
area then issued orders excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry 
from these areas. Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of 
Japanese ancestry, was convicted for remaining in one of the 
forbidden areas. His appeal, like that of Gordon Hirabayashi, who 
was convicted for violating a related curfew order, was 
representative of the 120,000 Japanese Americans who had been 
taken from their homes and placed in internment camps for the 
duration of the war. Although the Supreme Court exclaimed that 
the racial classification at issue in these appeals required “the 
most rigid” scrutiny, the Court accepted uncritically the judgment 
of the military authorities and of Congress that persons of 
Japanese ancestry presented a security risk to the United States.32 
The Court thus endorsed the government’s wholesale 
condemnation of the Japanese-American population without any 
record evidence of even a single instance of Japanese-American 
disloyalty. Careful scrutiny in theory was abdication of the Court’s 
role in fact. 
World War II also provided a test of the open court rule 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Milligan33 during the Civil War. 
In 1942, two German submarines landed eight saboteurs on 
beaches in New York and Florida. Before they could act, one of 
them quickly gave up the group to the FBI. President Roosevelt 
ordered that they be tried by military commission, which 
sentenced them to death. When the Supreme Court took up the 
legality of the military commission this time, in Ex parte Quirin,34 
                                                                                                     
 31. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 32. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223–24 (1944); 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 
U.S. 283 (1944) (directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to an admittedly 
loyal Japanese-American). 
 33. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 34. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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Milligan was distinguished.35 Although one of the Germans was a 
dual citizen, all eight were part of the armed forces of a state on 
which we had declared war. The Quirin Court thus created a 
declared enemy exception to the open court rule.36 On the one 
hand, it was extraordinary for the Supreme Court to entertain on 
its merits a high stakes challenge to the President’s military 
commission when the outcome of World War II remained very 
much in doubt. On the other hand, the Court heard and decided 
the fate of the saboteurs hurriedly, without adequate preparation, 
and the Justices accepted uncritically dubious justifications for 
truncated trial procedures in the military commission.  
The preeminent judicial decision in U.S. national security law 
was rendered during the Korean War. In Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,37 the Supreme Court rejected President 
Truman’s attempt to seize the nation’s steel mills to avert what he 
feared would be a strike that would compromise the war effort.38 
Congress had considered but decided against expressly granting 
the President the seizure authority in the Taft-Hartley legislation, 
and the President’s actions effectively nationalized a private 
industry thousands of miles from the theater of war.39 Again, the 
Court did not decline to decide the merits of the case, and a 
majority agreed that important separation-of-powers principles 
protective of Congress’s role in national security were at risk if the 
President’s seizure was sustained.40 
In more recent times, the courts began to exhibit a unique 
deference to the President’s national security decisions involving 
the military.41 For reasons that were never fully articulated, in the 
1970s the Supreme Court characterized the military as “a society 
apart from civilian society,” superior and more or less exempt from 
                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 19–20. 
36. Id. at 29 (noting that “petitioners were charged with an offense against 
the law of war which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury”). 
 37. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 38. Id. at 588–89. 
 39. See id. at 586 (“When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 
1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such 
governmental seizures in cases of emergency.”). 
 40. Id. at 588–89. 
 41. DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION 
CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 1–15, 153 (2010). 
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civilian judicial oversight.42 In a series of decisions, the Court did 
not ask the government to justify or even explain why an alleged 
military necessity justifies an intrusion on constitutional rights or 
the separation of powers.43 The bare assertion sufficed. One effect 
of judicial deference to military decisions, of course, is to send a 
message that the military does not have the same legal obligations 
as other actors in our government. The other message is that the 
civilian commanders in chief may use the military to overcome 
legal limits on their actions. 
IV. The Federal Courts after 9/11 
A. Detention and Rendition  
Within weeks of beginning ground combat in Afghanistan in 
late 2001, the Bush Administration had to decide where and how 
to detain and adjudicate the fate of persons captured on the 
battlefields. Bush Administration officials determined that 
Guantanamo offered security as well as a location that was on 
Cuban soil and leased to the U.S., providing cover, they assumed, 
from habeas corpus petitions. The goal was to have the “legal 
equivalent of outer space.”44 
President Bush relied on his commander-in-chief power and 
used the military to implement a program to apprehend and detain 
suspected terrorists without charge, without access to counsel or 
other due process protections, and without the prospect of release 
until the end of the war. The President’s Military Order formalized 
a detention system and a plan for eventual military commission 
trials that effectively made the executive the maker, enforcer, and 
adjudicator of law applied to the detainees, including American 
                                                                                                     
 42. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (describing judicial review of the military); 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (discussing judicial deference for the 
military generally). 
 43. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353–61 (1980) (justifying 
regulations intruding upon the free speech rights of members of the Air Force by 
asserting that such regulations were necessary to maintain the integrity of the 
military command structure). 
 44. HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
182 (2009). 
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citizens.45 Indeed, the Marine Corps base at Guantanamo Bay was 
selected for the military detention and trials because it was 
believed to be beyond the reach of our civilian courts.46  
Detainees soon began filing habeas corpus petitions in the 
federal courts challenging the lawfulness of their detention and 
arguing that due process required hearings to permit them to 
contest their combatant status. Over a period of more than four 
years, the lower courts and then the Supreme Court decided a 
series of such challenges on the merits. In doing so, the courts 
curtailed to some degree the discretion of the Bush Administration 
to run the Guantanamo facility as a sort of law-free zone. 
Admittedly, the decisions in Rasul v. Bush,47 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,48 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,49 and Boumediene v. Bush,50 were not 
unequivocal victories for the detainees, nor were the decisions 
models for clear and consistent doctrinal decision making by the 
judiciary. But the courts ruled that habeas corpus jurisdiction was 
available to the Guantanamo detainees, due process required some 
kind of process for the detainees, military commission trials had to 
comply with statutory and law of war requirements for fair 
procedure, and habeas corpus could be granted to the detainees by 
the federal courts.51  
Congress first enacted the Military Commission Act52 in 2006 
and effectively gave President Bush the discretion to have military 
trials similar to those he had authorized on his own authority.53 
                                                                                                     
45. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
46. Cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (finding that federal 
courts may have jurisdiction over Guantanamo alien petitioners’ habeas 
corpus claims). 
 47. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 48. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 49. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 50. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 51. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 794–98; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–35; Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 533–39; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481–85. 
 52. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 53. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2012) (granting the Executive Branch the 
power to determine whether a detainee is an enemy combatant and vesting 
exclusive jurisdiction over enemy combatants in Executive-appointed military 
tribunals). 
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Since 2008, the federal courts in the D.C. Circuit have struggled to 
develop standards to review continuing detentions.54 They are 
deciding cases, developing criteria for deciding who may be subject 
to continuing detention, and applying similar criteria to challenges 
arising from Afghanistan.55 The courts have performed their role 
reasonably well under the circumstances, neither deferring 
entirely to the government nor imposing trial-type procedures for 
detainees. 
The courts’ performance was also mixed in responding to the 
military detention of U.S. citizens—Hamdi and Jose Padilla—and 
resident alien student Ali al-Marri. Hamdi and Padilla each spent 
years in military detention in South Carolina, without counsel or 
any procedures to determine the lawfulness of detention. Hamdi 
was eventually deported after the Supreme Court upheld his 
detention but ordered that the government provide him due 
process.56 Padilla and then al-Marri were each eventually 
transferred from military to civilian custody where they were tried 
and convicted (Padilla) or plead guilty (al-Marri) to providing 
material support to terrorism.57 The courts acquiesced in executive 
branch shenanigans in shuffling them between military and 
civilian systems. Al-Marri received some credit at sentencing 
based on the harsh conditions of his military confinement, while 
Padilla and his mother brought civil lawsuits for wrongful 
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confinement and mistreatment while in custody.58 The lawsuits for 
damages were dismissed based on the immunities of the federal 
defendants for alleged misconduct within the scope of their official 
responsibilities.59 
More extreme judicial deference to executive abuses was 
shown in the extraordinary rendition cases. In El-Masri v. United 
States,60 federal courts ruled that the state secrets doctrine made 
it impossible for El-Masri to prove his case against the CIA.61 In 
Arar v. Ashcroft,62 Canadian citizen Maher Arar unsuccessfully 
brought suit in federal court following his detention for twelve days 
at Kennedy Airport and eventual rendition to Syria and torture 
over ten months in a Syrian prison.63 Although the original 
detention by U.S. officials was based on intelligence provided by 
Canada, Arar later received a cash settlement from his home 
government.64 Holding that Arar could not state a claim under an 
available federal statute nor a Bivens claim based on the 
Constitution, the Second Circuit dismissed his action.65 
B. Surveillance 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush secretly ordered 
the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept international 
telephone and email traffic without obtaining judicial warrants.66 
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What became known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) 
was flatly inconsistent with Congress’s regulation of foreign 
intelligence surveillance in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA).67 When the program came to light, the President 
defended it in large part on the basis of his commander-in-chief 
powers and argued that the program had “helped detect and 
prevent possible terrorist attacks on the United States and 
abroad.”68 The full scope of the NSA programs remained hidden 
until the Edward Snowden disclosures in 2013 led to a raft of 
declassifications and statements from Administration officials. 
Beyond the FISA violations, the NSA program may have violated 
Fourth Amendment privacy and First Amendment free expression 
rights of innocent Americans who were subjected to surveillance 
without suspicion of wrongdoing or judicial process. The TSP also 
threatened the separation of powers by simply ignoring the express 
limits of FISA. 
Once the TSP was exposed by the New York Times in 
December 2005, lawsuits were filed challenging the lawfulness of 
surveillance. The public interest plaintiffs ultimately failed to 
persuade a court to hear the merits of their FISA and Fourth 
Amendment claims due to a lack of standing—they could not show 
that any particular conversation had been intercepted.69 After 
Congress authorized sweeping programmatic electronic 
surveillance in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act,70 and the 
Snowden documents showed the wholesale NSA collection of 
metadata of Americans under the authority of a USA PATRIOT 
Act71 amendment to FISA, lawsuits were filed challenging the bulk 
collection. To date, district courts have reached the merits and split 
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on whether the metadata collection violates FISA and the Fourth 
Amendment.72 Appeals are pending.73 
C. Targeting 
When the media reported rumors that American-citizen-
turned-al Qaeda-operative Anwar al-Aulaqi may be on a target list 
for U.S. drone strikes in the campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen, 
al-Aulaqi’s father filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin any lethal action 
against his son. Applying traditional standing doctrine, his lawsuit 
was dismissed, unsurprisingly.74 A father lacks standing to sue on 
behalf of his son. After al-Aulaqi’s death in a drone strike in 2011, 
a second lawsuit brought by his parents seeking damages for a 
constitutional tort was dismissed because of “special factors” 
counseling hesitation by the courts under the Bivens doctrine.75 
The Bivens doctrine and its application to constitutional torts in 
national security settings have never been clear or adequately 
illuminated by the courts. More recently, however, FOIA litigation 
produced more transparency in the targeting debate, when a 
federal court ordered the release of an Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum written in 2010 that concluded that targeting al-
Aulaqi would be lawful.76 
 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746–53 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding that FISA authorized substantially all metadata 
collection and that the collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (concluding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ FISA claims but that the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Fourth 
Amendment claim”). 
 73. Notice of Appeal, Klayman v. Obama, No. 14-5209 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 
2014); Notice of Civil Appeal, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, No. 14-42 (2d 
Cir. Jan. 6, 2014). The Clapper appeal was argued on September 2nd. 
 74. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010).  
 75. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *6, *19 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 4, 2014).  
 76. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 124 & app. A (2d 
Cir. 2014). 
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN TIME OF WAR 185 
V. Conclusion 
Over time and with varying degrees of conviction, the courts 
have served as a necessary counterweight to government 
overreaching in times of national security crisis, when passions 
and momentary impulses are most likely to affect policy. On the 
one hand, it is easy to underestimate the institutional problems 
confronting judges who are asked to make momentous decisions in 
times of national crisis—difficulties of fact-finding and assessing 
the risks of being wrong, among others. On the other hand, no 
other part of government is as equipped as the judiciary to anchor 
the nation to its core values during a storm. The risks of judicial 
tolerance or abstinence are simply too great now, as they have been 
in other times of war. 
